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I. INTRODUCTION 
The last decade has been marked by a seemingly unending number of mass flights of 
people fleeing their native lands, seeking a new life in foreign countries. For example, 
since 1970,800,000 Haitians have left Haiti, principally bound for the Dominican Repub-
lic, the United States, and the Bahamas.! In 1978, the invasion of Cambodia by Vietnam 
forced several hundred thousand Cambodians to flee into Thailand.2 Since 1979, it is 
estimated that over 500,000 Salvadorans have left El Salvador for the United States and 
the Latin American countries.3 Over 40,000 Sudanese fled to Ethiopia during the first six 
months of 1984 to escape a civil war and accompanying food shortages.4 
While these groups have received a great deal of international attention, they consti-
tute only a small part of the total number of nationals throughout the world who have fled 
their homelands and are without the protection of another country.5 In 1983, the total 
I U.S. COMMITTEE FOR REFUGEES, AMERICAN COUNCIL FOR NATIONALITIES SERVICE, WORLD 
REFUGEE SURVEY 69 (1983) [hereinafter cited as WORLD REFUGEE SURVEY). 
2 [d. at 66. 
3 [d. at 42. 
4 N.Y. Times, May 6, 1984, at 1, col. 5. 
5 The protection which a state provides its nationals is based on the State's territorial 
sovereignty. Therefore, under international law, a State is not obligated, or may be unable, to 
provide its protection to a national who has left its territory. See J. SWEENEY, C. OLIVER AND N. LEECH, 
CASE AND MATERIALS ON THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM 488-89 (1981) [hereinafter cited as THE 
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM). With regard to the duty a State owes aliens within its borders, 
international law is unsettled. The United States and other Western countries have generally 
promoted the concept of a minimum international standard of treatment for all aliens consisting of 
adherence to the "ordinary standards of civilization." See Roberts v. United Mexican States (U.S. v. 
Mex.), 4 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 77 (1926). The position of Latin America and the Third World 
generally is that aliens are entitled to treatment equal to that of the nationals of the State in which the 
alien finds him or herself. See generally THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM, supra at 547-73. 
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number of persons in such a position worldwide was estimated at nearly eight million.6 
That number is now larger than at any other time in modern history, except for the 
period immediately following World War II, and is expected to continue to grow.7 
An estimated fifty percent of these refugees are ineligible for asylum8 because they 
fail to satisfy the definition of refugee established by the 1951 United Nations Convention 
on the Status of Refugees9 ("1951 Convention"). It is argued by many writers that, 
because of this, the definition of refugee in the 1951 Convention, which requires that the 
individual be in danger of persecution in his or her native land, should be broadened to 
include victims of economic and political instability or natural disasters. lo In support of 
their argument to broaden the definition it is pointed out that the definition of refugee 
used today was developed in the immediate post-World War II period, when millions of 
people, mainly Europeans, were homeless or unwilling to return to their native countries 
after Nazi occupation. Approximately ninety-eight percent of all refugees today, how-
"ever, are from developing countries. II Two-thirds are from Africa and Asia alone. 12 It is 
argued that in addition to political persecution and the ravages of war, the modern 
refugee flees the whole range of problems which accompany underdevelopment in the 
post-colonial period, including civil strife, political instability, and harsh economic condi-
tions. 13 Though the post-World War II refugee and the modern refugee are thus treated 
differently under international law, the actual position of both groups is the same. 14 
Hence, the argument continues, both groups should be accorded the same rights under 
international law. 
A refugee group which could benefit from such a change is that group which has fled 
the civil war in El Salvador. As of 1983, the United States Department of State had 
categorized Salvadorans into three groups. The first, and smallest, includes those who 
qualify as political refugees. The second group includes those considered poor peasants 
who have simply been displaced by the fighting accompanying the civil war. This group 
consists of approximately 60,000 Salvadorans residing in refugee camps in Honduras, 
Guatemala, Costa Rica, and other surrounding countries. The third group, numbering 
approximately 600,000, contains those Salvadorans classified as "economic migrants," of 
which some 250,000-400,000 are in this country in search of a better way of life. Under 
this classification scheme, members of the second and third group are not eligible for 
asylum. 15 
This note examines whether a basis currently exists in international law for broaden-
ing the definition of refugee. Even though there is some indication of a broadening of the 
6 WORLD REFUGEE SURVEY, sufrra note 1, at 61. At least one other commentator places the figure 
at 15 million. Nanda, World Refugee Assistance: The Role 0/ International Law and Institutions, 9 HOFSTRA 
L. REV. 449,449 (1981). 
7 Nanda, supra note 6, at 449. 
B For a definition of asylum see infra text accompanying note 24. 
9 See infra notes 41-59 and accompanying text. 
\0 Chamberlain, The Mass Migration of Refugees and International Law, 7 FLETCHER FORUM 93, 
103-04 (1983); Fragoman, The Refugee: A Problem 0/ Definition, 3 CASE W. REs. J. INT'L L. 45, 
58 (1970); Plender, Admission of Refugees: Draft Convention on Territorial Asylum, 15 SAN DIEGO 
L. REv. 45, 54-55 (1977); Woods, The Term 'Refugee' in International and Municipal Law: An Inadequate 
Definition in Light 0/ the Cuban Boatlift, 5 ASILS INT'L L. J. 39,64 (1981). 
11 Chamberlain, supra note 10, at 104. 
12 Nanda, supra note 6, at 449 nJ. 
13 Fragoman, supra note 10, at 58. 
14 Plender, sUfrra note 10, at 54-55. 
15 WORLD REFUGEE SURVEY, supra note I, at 43. 
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definition on a regional level ,16 recent deliberations on the Draft Convention on Territo-
rial Asylum indicate that there is little possibility of such a change being accepted on an 
international scale in the near future. 17 Moreover, given the current structure of the 1951 
Convention, simply broadening the definition will not ensure that the definition is inter-
preted and applied in the manner intended. Implementation of the 1951 Convention 
through the domestic laws of each of the States party to the convention permits national 
and foreign policy interests to shape the interpretation and application of the definition 
of refugee. IS A more effective course of action for those concerned with the protection of 
refugees would be to first insure the consistent application of existing norms. Ultimately, 
the development of enforcement mechanisms for the 1951 Convention,19 and the crea-
tion of a right for individuals or organizations to petition an international or regional 
appeals council, would provide impartial enforcement, ensure consistency, and bring the 
1951 Convention in line with emerging practices under other human rights conven-
tions.20 
II. CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 
The practice of States granting asylum to non-nationals who have fled their native 
countries has ancient origins. It can be traced as far back as the ancient Mediterranean 
civilizations, when humanitarian concerns led to the provision of refuge for individuals 
fleeing from political or religious oppression or, in some cases, for common criminals.21 
Other, more modern practices by States have included an Act of the British Parliament in 
1708 offering naturalization to members of the "Protestant or Reformed Religion" and 
the 1685 Edict of Potsdam, whereby Friedrich Wilhelm authorized the Huguenots of 
France to settle in Brandenburg and Prussia.22 The French Constitution of June 24, 1793, 
included a right to asylum. 23 
Asylum has been defined as "the protection which a State grants on its territory or in 
some other place under the control of certain of its organs, to a person who comes to seek 
it."24 The protection of persons within its borders by a State is based upon its territorial 
sovereignty,25 so the granting of asylum under customary international law is regarded as 
an entirely discretionary State action.26 As a requirement of State sovereignty, customary 
international law leaves the formulation of policies and criteria which determine who shall 
be granted asylum to each individual StateP It is, therefore, generally accepted custom-
ary international law that individuals do not have a right to asylum.28 Instead, the State 
has the absolute discretion to decide whether or not to extend its protection to aliens 
16 See infra notes 97-101 and accompanying text. 
17 See infra notes 70-96 and accompanying text. 
18 See infra notes 102-09 and accompanying text. 
19 See infra notes 110-11 and accompanying text. 
20 See infra notes 112-16 and accompanying text. 
21 Krenz, The Refugee as a Subject of International Law, 15 INT'L & COMPo L.Q. 90, 91 (1966). 
22 1 A. GRAHL-MADSEN, THE STATUS OF REFUGEES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 10 (1966). 
23 Id. 
24 Krenz,supra note 21, at 91 (quoting Institute of International Law, 1 ANNUAIRE 167 (1950)). 
25Id. 
26 Id.; Johnson, Refugees, Departees and Illegal Migrants, 9 SYDNEY L. REV. 11, 24 (1980). See 
also, OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW 677-78 (H. Lauterpacht 8th ed. 1955); J. BRIERLY, THE 
LAW OF NATIONS 217 (1955). 
27 Nanda, supra note 6, at 456-57. 
28Id. 
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within its borders. Consequently, the definition of "refugee" under customary interna-
tional law is left to the law of each individual State, technically making it impossible to 
form a definition of refugee under customary international law. The concept of refugee 
exists only within specific international or domestic legal contexts.29 
III. CONVENTIONAL INTERNATIONAL LAW 
A. Historical Development 
Territorial sovereignty, which gives a State the absolute right to decide whether or 
not to allow an alien to enter its territory, also ensures that no State is under any obligation 
to return a non-national to his native country, even upon the request of the alien's 
government.30 Because of the desire of States to prosecute criminals who have fled their 
territorial jurisdiction, the first international agreements dealing with the treatment of 
non-nationals by a State were extradition treaties. First used in the nineteenth century, 
these bilateral agreements, based on reciprocity, typically list a number of offenses which 
the contracting States agree constitute grounds for the return of a person. Extraditable 
offenses include most criminal acts.3l The consistent exception, however, are those acts 
which constitute political offenses.32 
In the early twentieth century, limited bilateral instruments which dealt with specific 
groups of displaced persons, such as those which fled the Russian Revolution,33 were the 
first type of international instruments to address the problem of refugees specifically.34 
Definitional problems rarely arose in the context of these instruments, as they referred to 
specific groups of refugees.3s 
The first multilateral instruments dealing with refugees were the result of the efforts 
of the League of Nations. Specifically, these were the 1933 Convention Relating to the 
International Status of Refugees36 (" 1933 Convention") and the 1938 Convention Con-
cerning the Status of Refugees Coming from Germany37 (" 1938 Convention"). The 1933 
Convention contained a more flexible definition3M than those agreements dealing with 
specific groups of refugees, as it allowed modifications by each contracting party. France 
took advantage of this provision to extend the Convention's applicability, which already 
included Russians and Armenians, to Spanish refugees.39 
At the close of World War II, the existence of millions of displaced persons, mainly 
Europeans, who refused to be repatriated, forced the world community to broaden its 
approach to the problem of refugees.40 One of several responses to the situation was the 
1951 ConventionY 
29 A. GRAHL-MADSEN, supra note 22, at 73. 
30 Krenz, supra note 21 at 91. 
3l See, THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM,Supra note 5, at 138-44 (1981) and cases cited therein. 
32 Id. 
33 Krenz, supra note 21, at 99. 
34 Id.; Fragomen, supra note 10, at 47. 
35 Weis, The Concept of the Refugee in International Law, 87 J. DU DROIT INT'L 928,930 (1960). 
36 159 L.N.T.S. 199. 
37 192 L.N.T.S. 59. 
38 Article 1 of the 1933 Convention applied its provisions to Russian, Armenian and assimilated 
refugees, subject to such modifications as each contracting party might introduce at the moment of 
signature or accession. Weis, supra note 35, at 930. 
39 Id. 
40 Fragomen, supra note 10, at 47. 
4l 19 V.S.T. 6260; T.I.A.S. No. 6577; 189 V.N.T.S. 137. 
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B. The 1951 Convention 
The 1951 Convention, drafted by the United Nations to meet the problem of the 
millions of refugees left homeless by World War II, was the first international agreement 
to set out the rights of refugees as well as the responsibilities of the world community to 
refugees. Intended to revise and consolidate all previous international agreements on 
refugees42 it is still the leading international agreement on refugees. Under the 1951 
Convention, minimum standards for the treatment of refugees in certain areas are to be 
equivalent to each State's treatment of its own nationals. 43 In addition, refugees are 
assured specific rights to property,44 association,45 access to courts,46 self-employment,47 
housing,4H and movement49 of a level generally accorded other aliens in residence in the 
42 Nanda, supra note 6, at 452. 
43 For example: 
Article 4: Religion: The Contracting States shall accord to refugees within their 
territories treatment at least as favourable as that accorded to their nationals with 
respect to freedom to practice their religion and freedom as regards the religious 
education of their children. 
Article 23: Public Relief: The Contracting States shall accord to refugees lawfully 
staying in their territory the same treatment with respect to public relief and assistance 
as is accorded to their nationals. 
Other areas in which refugees are to be accorded treatment equal to that of the host country's 
nationals include public elementary education (art. 22), rationing (art. 20), and labor legislation and 
social security (art. 24). 
44 Article 13: Movable and Im17Wvable Prrrperty: The Contracting States shall accord to 
a refugee treatment as favourable as possible and, in any event, not less favourable than 
that accorded to aliens generally in the same circumstances, as regards the acquisition 
of movable and immovable property and other rights pertaining thereto, and to leases 
and other contracts relating to movable and immovable property. 
45 Article 15: Right of Association: As regards non-political and non-pro fit-making 
associations and trade unions the Contracting States shall accord to refugees lawfully 
staying in their territory the most favourable treatment accorded to nationals of a 
foreign country, in the same circumstances. 
46 Article 16: Access to Courts: (1) A refugee shall have free access to the courts of law 
on the territory of all Contracting States. (2) A refugee shall enjoy in the Contracting 
State in which he has his habitual residence the same treatment as a national in matters 
pertaining to access to the courts, including legal assistance and exemption from cautio 
judicatum solui. (3) A refugee shall be accorded in the matters referred to in paragraph 2 
in countries other than that in which he has habitual residence the treatment granted to 
a national of the country of his habitual residence. 
47 Article 18: Self-Employment: The Contracting States shall accord to a refugee law-
fully in their territory treatment as favourable as possible and, in any event, not less 
favourable than that accorded to aliens generally in the same circumstances, as regards 
the right to engage on his own account in agriculture, industry, handicrafts and 
commerce and to establish commercial and industrial companies. 
48 Article 21: Housing: As regards housing, the Contracting States, in so far as the 
matter is regulated by laws or regulations or is subject to the control of public au-
thorities, shall accord to refugees lawfully staying in their territory treatment as favour-
able as possible and, in any event, not less favourable than that accorded to aliens 
generally in the same circumstances . 
• 9 Article 26: Movement: Each Contracting State shall accord to refugees lawfully in 
its territory the right to choose their place of residence and to move freely within its 
territory, subject to any regulations applicable to aliens generally in the same circum-
stances. 
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host country. In return, refugees must conform to the laws and regulations of the host 
country.50 
Other substantive provisions include requirements for issuing identity papers to 
refugees, prohibitions against expelling refugees to the borders of territories where their 
life or freedom may be threatened ("refoulement"), and clemency for refugees who 
unlawfully enter their host country. 51 
Execution of the Convention is left to the contracting States through their domestic 
laws.52 However, they are required to "communicate to the Secretary-General of the 
United Nations the laws and regulations which they may adopt to ensure the application 
of [the] Convention."53 The Convention further grants the United Nations Office of the 
High Commissioner for Refugees5' ("UNHCR") the duty of "supervising the application 
of the provisions of this Convention"55 and requires the contracting States to provide 
UNHCR "with information and statistical data requested concerning: (a) the condition of 
refugees, (b) the implementation ofthis Convention, and (c) laws, regulations and decrees 
which are, or may hereafter be, in force relating to refugees."56 
Article I of the 1951 Convention sets out the definition of the term "refugee." In 
addition to any person who has previously been termed a refugee under various interna-
tional instruments,57 a refugee is any person who: 
[a]s a result of events occurring before I January 1951 and owing to a 
well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nation-
ality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside 
the country of his nationality and is unable, or owing to such fear, is unwilling 
to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a 
nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a 
result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to 
it. 58 
The words "events occurring before 1 January 1951" could mean either "events occurring 
in Europe before 1 January 1951" or "events occurring in Europe or elsewhere before 1 
January 1951 (emphasis added)."59 Article I(B)(I) directed each contracting State to 
.0 Article 2: General Obligations: Every refugee has duties to the country in which he 
finds himself, which require in particular that he conform to its laws and regulations as 
well as to measures taken for the maintenance of public order . 
• 1 See arts. 27, 33, and 31. 
o:l This conclusion, though explicitly stated nowhere in the Convention, is clear from the overall 
structure of the Convention and the language of arts. 35(2)(b) and 36. 
53 Art. 36. 
5' UNHCR is the arm of the United Nations primarily responsible for providing aid to refugees. 
Funded on a voluntary basis by U.N. members and other governmental and non-governmental 
agencies, UNHCR provides refugees with a wide range of services, including material and legal 
assistance. See generally, Nanda, supra note 6, at 460-63. 
55 Art. 35(1). 
56 Art. 35(2). 
57 The instruments noted are the Arrangements of 12 May 1926, 89 L.N.T.S. 47, and 30 June 
1928,89 L.N.T.S. 63, the Conventions of28 October 1933,159 L.N.T.S. 199, and 10 February 1938, 
192 L.N.T.S. 59, the Protocol of 14 September 1939, 198 L.N.T.S. 141, and the Constitution of the 
International Refugee Organization, T.I.A.S. 1846, 62 Stat. 3037. See art. I(A)(l) . 
.. Art. I(A)(2). 
59 Art. I(B)(I). This limitation was adopted in part because ofthe drafting committee's sense of 
political reality. The committee discussed the possibility of including all refugees irres pective of their 
origin and irrespective of the fact that the events which caused the breaking off of ties with their 
1985] REFUGEE IN INTERNATIONAL LA W 189 
declare at the time of signature, ratification, or accession which of the meanings it had 
adopted. Ambivalence toward the geographical limitation is indicated, however, by the 
adoption of the following recommendation into the official minutes of the conference 
which ratified the Convention: 
The Conference ... expresses the hope that the Convention Relating to the 
Status of Refugees will have value as an example exceeding its contractual 
scope and that all nations would be guided by it in granting, so far as possible, 
to persons in their territory as refugees and who would not be covered by the 
terms of the Convention, the treatment for which it provides.60 
The January 1, 1951 limitation of the 1951 Convention was removed by the Protocol 
Relating to the Status of Refugees of January 31, 196761 ("Protocol"). The Protocol, 
adopted because "new refugee situations [had] arisen since the [1951] Convention was 
adopted and ... the refugees concerned may therefore not fall within the scope of the 
[1951] Convention,"62 expressly adopted the substantive provisions of the 1951 Conven-
tion,63 along with the entire definition of refugee contained in article 1 of the 1951 
Convention, omitting the restrictive words "as a result of events occurring before 1 
January 1951."64 Article 1(3) of the Protocol further extinguished the geographic limita-
tion in article 1 (B)(1) of the 1951 Convention, except for those States party to the 1951 
Convention which had already adopted the restriction. While the Protocol did not ex-
pressly adopt the procedural sections of the 1951 Convention,65 its procedural provisions 
are, in fact, the same as those in the 1951 Convention.66 
country of origin belonged to the past or to the future. This approach was rejected, however, because 
the committee decided it would be difficult for a government to sign a "blank cheque" and undertake 
obligations towards "future refugees, the origin and number of which would be unknown." Frago-
man, supra note 10, at 53 n.30 (quoting Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Refugees and Stateless 
Persons, U.N. Doc. EI1618 at 38 (1951». 
60 U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 21108 at 9. 
61 19 U.S.T. 6224, T.I.A.S. No. 6577, 606 U.N.T.S. 267. 
62 /d. (Preamble). 
63 Art. 1(1): 
The States Parties to the present Protocol undertake to apply articles 2 to 34(2) inclusive 
of the [1951] Convention to refugees as hereinafter defined. 
64 Art. 1(2). 
65 See supra notes 52-56 and accompanying text. 
66 Compare arts. II and Ill, infra, and text accompanying notes 52-56, supra. 
Art. II: (1) The States Parties to the present Protocol undertake to co-operate with 
the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, or any other agency 
of the United Nations which may succeed it, in the exercise of its functions, and shall in 
particular facilitate its duty of supervising the application of the provisions of the 
present Protocol. 
(2) In order to enable the Office of the High Commissioner, or any other agency of 
the United Nations which may succeed it, to make reports to the competent organs of 
the United Nations, the States Parties to the present Protocol undertake to provide 
them with the information and statistical data requested; in the appropriate form, 
concerning: 
(a) the condition of refugees; 
(b) the implementation of the present Protocol; 
(c) Laws, regulations and decrees which are, or may hereafter be, in force relating 
to refugees. 
Art. III: The States Parties to the present Protocol shall communicate to the 
Secretary-General of the United Nations the laws and regulations which they may 
adopt to ensure the application of the present Protocol. 
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The 1951 Convention and the Protocol have, as of 1983, been ratified by at least 
ninety countries.67 A handful of countries have acceded to one instrument but not the 
other. For example, three states which are party to the Convention have not ratified the 
Protocol.68 The United States and Swaziland are the only two States which have ratified 
the Protocol but not the Convention.69 Given that the Protocol is virtually identical to the 
Convention in its substantive and procedural requirements, ratification of only the Pro-
tocol, and not the 1951 Convention as well, does not change the overall substantive and 
procedural responsibilities of the contracting States. Ratification of only the 1951 Conven-
tion, however, results in a very restricted commitment to refugee assistance. Under the 
1951 Convention alone, the definition of refugee is limited to persons affected by events 
occurring before January 1, 1951. If the signatory State adopted the optional limitation of 
article I(B)(l), the definition is further limited to events occurring only in Europe. 
C. The Drajt Convention on Territorial Asylum 
The most recent effort of the United Nations in the area of conventional interna-
tionallaw affecting refugees was abandoned in 1977, when action on the Draft Conven-
tion on Territorial Asylum ("Draft Convention") was indefinitely postponed after rep-
resentatives failed to reach agreement on the text. 70 This abandonment marked the end 
of nearly thirty years of work by the United Nations on the status of refugees under 
international law.71 
In 1948, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the Universal Declaration on 
Human Rights,72 a non-binding resolution which included the statement "everyone has 
the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution."73 The 
Commission on Human Rights, which drafted the Declaration, suggested at about that 
time that "the question of the inclusion of the right of asylum from persecution in the 
International Bill of Human Rights or in a special convention for that purpose"74 should 
be examined at the earliest opportunity. A lack of agreement among States, however, as to 
67 According to the WORLD REFUGEE SURVEY,SUpra note I, at 4, the signatories include: Algeria, 
Angola, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Benin, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Burundi, Canada, 
Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Denmark, Djibouti, 
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, 
Germany (Federal Republic of), Ghana, Greece, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guatemala, Holy See, 
Iceland, Iran, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Kenya, Lesotho, liberia, liechten-
stein, Luxembourg, Mali, Malta, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, 
Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Peoples Republic of China, Philippines, Portugal, Rwanda, Sao Tome 
and Principie, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Spain, Sudan, Surinam, Sweden, Switzer-
land, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, United Kingdom, United Republic of Cameroon, United 
Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. 
"6 Madagascar, Monaco, and Peru. Id. 
69 WORLD REFUGEE SURVEY, supra note I, at 4. 
70 Plender, supra note 10, at 48. 
71 Most of the discussion in this section is taken from two excellent, very detailed articles which 
chronicle this period: Weis, The United Nations Declaration on Territorial Asylum, 7 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 92 
(1969) [hereinafter cited as Weis, Declaration on Territorial Asylum] and Weis, The Draft United Nations 
Convention on Territorial Asylum, 50 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 151 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Weis, Draft 
Convention on Territorial Asylum]. 
72 U.N.Y.B. 535 (1948-49). 
73 Art. 14(1). The original version of the article, before adoption, read: "everyone has a right to 
seek and to be granted ... asylum." Weis, Draft Convention on Territorial Asylum, supra note 71, at 151. 
Dr. We is quotes the late Sir Hersch Lauterpacht as describing the article as adopted as "artificial to 
the point of flippancy." Id. 
74 Weis, Declaration on Territorial Asylum, supra note 71, at 94-95. 
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a series of central issues, led to the failure to include any clause pertaining to asylum in the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 75 The issues dividing the members 
were the same central issues discussed during negotiations on the Draft Convention: the 
personal scope of such a clause, the definition of the person to whom asylum should be 
granted, and whether a right to asylum should be created. 76 
After an impasse on these issues which lasted several years, a Draft Declaration on the 
Right of Asylum was submitted to the Commission on Human Rights in 1957 by the 
French representative. 77 On December 14, 1967, after ten years of discussion by the 
Commission and the consideration of the draft declaration by two committees of the 
General Assembly, General Assembly Resolution No. 2312, entitled "Declaration on 
Territorial Asylum", was unanimously adopted by the General Assembly.78 
Soon after adoption of the Declaration, efforts began to establish a Convention on 
Territorial Asylum. In 1971, the European Office of the Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace at Geneva, in conjunction with the UNHCR convened a "Colloquium 
on Territorial Asylum and the Protection of Refugees in International Law." At this 
meeting and a series of subsequent meetings over the next two years, a group of eminent 
international lawyers, members of the International Law Commission, and representa-
tives of various United Nations member States and international and regional commis-
sions, prepared a draft which was submitted in 1973 to the General Assembly. In 1974, 
the General Assembly directed the President of the General Assembly to establish a 
Group of Experts on the Draft Convention, composed of representatives of not more 
than twenty-seven States which were to be selected on the basis of geographical distribu-
tion after consultation with different regional groups. The Group's mandate was to meet 
75 Weis, Draft Convention on Territorial Asylum, supra note 71, at 151. 
76 Compare Weis,Draft Convention on Territorial Asylum, supra note 71, at 151 and notes 84-92 infra 
and accompanying text. 
77 Weis, Declaration on Territorial Asylum, supra note 71, at 97. The draft read as follows: 
I. Responsibility for granting asylum to persons requesting it shall lie with the 
international community as represented by the United Nations. 
2. Every person whose life, physical integrity or liberty is threatened, in violation of 
the principles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, shall be regarded as 
entitled to seek asylum. 
3. By granting asylum in accordance with articles I and 2, a State shall incur no 
international responsibility. Asylum granted by such a State shall be respected by all 
other States. 
4. (a) Irrespective of any action taken by particular States, the United Nations shall, 
in a spirit of international solidarity, consult with States as to the most effective means 
of providing help and assistance for the persons referred to in article 2. 
(b) Other States shall examine, in a like spirit of solidarity, appropriate measures to 
lighten the burden of countries of first asylum including admission to their territory of 
a certain number of persons first granted asylum in another State. 
5. No one shall be subjected to measures, such as expulsion, return or rejection at 
the frontier, which would result in compelling him to return to or remain in a territory 
where his life, physical integrity or liberty would be threatened, in violation of the 
principles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. This principle shall not apply 
in the case of persons whom there are reasonable grounds for regarding as a danger to 
the security of the receiving country or who, having been convicted by a final judgment 
of a particularly serious crime, constitute a danger to the community of that country. 
78 G.A. Res. 2312, U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 81. For an excellent summary and analysis of 
the text of the Declaration as finally adopted, see Weis, Draft Convention on Territorial Asylum, supra 
note 71, at 135-45. 
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no later than May 1975 tor a maximum often working days to review the text of the Draft 
Convention. 79 
The Draft Convention as reported out by the Group of Experts did not significantly 
change the definition of refugee established by the 1951 Convention. Article 2 of the 
Draft Convention, concerning the scope of application of the document, read: 
1. A person shall be eligible for the benefits of this Convention if he, owing to 
a well-founded fear of: 
(a) Persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a 
particular social group or political opinion, including the struggle against 
colonialism and apartheid, or 
(b) Prosecution or punishment for acts directly related to the persecution 
as set forth in (a), 
is unable or unwilling to return to the country of his nationality, or, if he 
has no nationality, the country of his former habitual residence.~o 
In this form the draft article represented little change from the 1951 Convention, except 
for the inclusion of two additional clauses. The first clause added "the struggle against 
colonialism and apartheid" as a permissible basis tor persecution. This clause could have 
broadened the basis for claiming asylum, although the determination of when persecu-
tion has occurred in the struggle against colonialism would have been difficult to define. 
The second clause created an additional basis for asylum for "prosecution or punishment 
for acts related to the persecution as set forth in clause (a)." This clause would seem to 
broaden the grounds upon which asylum could be granted. 
Other sections of the draft at this stage also represented a relaxation of the interna-
tional posture toward granting asylum. Article I stated that each contracting State shall 
use its "best endeavours in a humanitarian spirit"~l to grant asylum to any person eligible 
for the benefits of the Draft Convention. Article 3 provided in absolute terms that no 
person who fits within the Draft Convention's scope and is within the territory of a 
contracting State can be compelled to return to his country of origin if his life or freedom 
will be threatened therein.~2 Article 8 stated that "the grant of territorial asylum ... is a 
peaceful and humanitarian act. It shall not be regarded as an act unfriendly to any other 
State and shall be respected by all States."~3 
After the work of the Group of Experts was completed, a conference of plenipoten-
tiaries was convened from January 10 to February 4, 1977, at the request of the General 
Assembly. On January 13, consideration of the Draft Convention began.84 With regard to 
79 Weis, Convention on Territorial Asylum, supra note 71, at 152-54. 
80 [d. at 155. 
81 Jd. There is no comparable article in the 1951 Convention or Protocol. 
82 [d. at 156. This is an expression of the principle of non-refoulement, also contained in art. 33 
of the 1951 Convention: 
1. No Con~racting State shall expel or return ("refouler") a refugee in any manner 
whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened 
on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or 
political opinion. 
2. The benefit of the present provision may not, however, be claimed by a refugee 
whom there are reasonable grounds for regarding as a danger to the security of the 
country in which he is, or who, having been convicted by a final judgment of a 
particular serious crime, constitutes a danger to the community of that country. 
83 [d. at 157. There is no comparable article in the 1951 Convention or Protocol. 
84 Id. at 159-60. 
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article 2, concerning application of the Draft Convention, there was no discussion of 
expanding the definition of refugee to include persons other than political refugees. To 
the contrary, according to one participant'S account of the proceedings, discussion re-
volved around three issues: (a) amendments seeking to amend the introductory phrase of 
the paragraph so as to emphasize even more strongly the sovereign right of the State to 
grant or refuse asylum; (b) amendments seeking to add to the grounds of persecution; 
and (c) amendments relating to paragraph 2 seeking to widen the exclusion clauses.85 
As a result of these discussions, and after a fairly close vote (38 to 34, with 15 
abstentions), an amendment was adopted replacing the words "if he, owing to a well-
founded fear of persecution," taken from the 1951 Convention,with "if he, being faced 
with a definite possibility of persecution .... ""6 The requirement of a "definite possibility" 
of persecution, rather than a "well-founded fear," created a much more restrictive 
definition than that contained in the 1951 Convention."7 
In other action on article 2, a sub-paragraph was added which read: "(3) The 
provisions of paragraph I of this article shall also not apply to any person requesting 
territorial asylum for purely economic reasons.""" Also, the grounds of persecution were 
expanded to include reasons of "kinship, foreign occupation, alien domination, and all 
forms of racism.""9 The new version of article 2 was adopted 47 votes to 14 with 21 
abstentions. 90 
Under article 3, an additional exception to the principle of non-refoulement at a 
State's border was created in the case of "a great number of persons whose massive influx 
may constitute a serious problem to the security of a Contracting State."91 Additional 
articles on the duties of those seeking asylum and the facilitation of family reunification 
were also adopted. 92 
The Conference did not complete action on the entire Draft Convention before the 
end of the time allocated to it. In its final message to the General Assembly, the confer-
ence recommended that the General Assembly "consider the question of convening at an 
appropriate time a further session of the Conference."93 At that time most Western 
delegations were not in favor of an early resumption.94 
Given the length of time spent working on the Draft Convention and its predecessor 
agreements, the lack of effective action is disappointing.95 Such an international effort is 
not likely to be undertaken again soon. In addition, given the direction the Draft 
Convention was taking, it can be surmised that no international consensus exists to 
support a broadening of the definition of refugee as it currently exists in the 1951 
B5 Id. at 162. 
B6 This amendment was proposed orally by Argentina, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, and the 
Philippines. Id. 
B7 The definition in the 1951 Convention implies both an objective ("well-founded") and a 
subjective ("fear of persecution") test for granting asylum. The amendment was interpreted as 
intending to do away with the subjective element altogether. Id. 
BB Id. at 163. 
B9Id. 
90 Id. 
91 Id. at 168. Compare with art. 33 of the 1951 Convention, supra note 82. 
92 Id. at 164-66. 
93 Id. at 168. 
94 Id. 
95 Forthe reactions of some of those present,see id. at 169-71; A. GRAHL-MADSEN, infra note 112, 
at 61-101. 
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Convention to include economic refugees. As one participant in the proceedings con-
cluded: 
In this situation it seems unlikely that a Convention on Territorial Asylum 
which constitutes progress from the legal and humanitarian angles could be 
concluded in the near future on a universal level· within the framework of the 
United Nations, and still less likely that it would be widely ratified. 96 
D. Regional Developments 
In contrast to the trend toward narrowing the definition of refugee on an interna-
tional level, actions by many regional organizations have broadened it. This trend is 
especially significant because in some cases these actions represent the legal posture of 
States which have not acceded to either the 1951 Convention or the 1967 Protocol. 
The work of the Organization of African Unity is one example of the trend toward 
broadening the definition on the regional level. The African States, reportedly generous 
in granting asylum to great numbers of refugees and credited with a progressive attitude 
at the Conference on the Draft Convention on Territorial Asylum,97 met in 1969 and 
adopted the Organization of African Unity Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of 
Refugee Problems in Africa. It contained the following quite broad definition of refugee: 
[A refugee is] ... every person who owing to external aggression, 
occupation, foreign domination, or events seriously disturbing public order in 
either part or the whole of his country of origin or nationality, is compelled to 
leave his place of habitual residence in order to seek refuge in another place 
outside his country of origin or nationality.98 
In other regional actions, article 22(7) of the Organization of American States 
Convention on Human Rights, adopted on November 22, 1969, established a right to 
asylum: "Every person has the right to seek and be granted asylum in a foreign territory, 
in accordance with the legislation of the state and international conventions in the event 
he is being pursued for political offenses or related common crimes."99 In 1977, after the 
Conference on the Draft Convention on Territorial Asylum, and in reaction to article 2 of 
that Draft Convention,100 the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, another 
regional organization, adopted a Declaration on Territorial Asylum. It stated in part: "In 
fulfilling their humanitarian duties, the Member States of the Council of Europe reaffirm 
their intention to maintain their liberal attitude with regard to persons seeking asylum in 
their territory."101 
IV. THE PROBLEM OF DOMESTIC IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 1951 CONVENTION 
The 1951 Convention and Protocol are implemented through the domestic laws of 
each of their contracting States. t02 The 1951 Convention's definition of refugee is, there-
96 Weis, Draft Convention on Terntonal Asylum, supra note 71, at 169. But see Plender, supra note 
10, at 61: " ... the failure of [the 1977] Conference to reach agreement constitutes no objection to a 
renewed effort to redefine [refugee]." 
97 Weis, Draft Convention on Territorial Asylum, supra note 71, at 170. 
98 [d. 
99 9 INT'L LEGAL MAT. 673, 682 (1970). 
100 Weis, Draft Convention on Territonal Asylum, supra note 71, at 170. 
101 [d. An interesting argument using the Convention Relating to Stateless Persons to expand 
the definition of refugees is set out in Woods, supra note 10, at 418-49. 
102 See supra notes 52 & 66 and accompanying text. 
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fore, frequently used as the basis for an individual State's policies for granting asylum. 
For example, the definition of refugee in the 1951 Convention and Protocol has been 
incorporated into the domestic laws of Denmark, France, Germany, Norway, and Swe-
den.103 The United States and the United Kingdom have based parts of their immigration 
laws on these instruments. 104 
Even adoption of the current definition by all of the parties to the 1951 Convention, 
however, does not ensure its consistent interpretation and application. As long as the 
definition of refugee evolves solely on a nation by nation basis, national interests will 
continue to be involved in its interpretation and application. l05 An example of this is the 
current influx of refugees from El Salvador into the United States, discussed above.106 In 
its 1983 Country Reports on the World Refugee Situation, the United States Department 
of State estimated that the majority of Salvadorans in the United States are economic 
migrants. The Department claims that these Salvadorans are in search of a way to earn a 
living, rather than fleeing political persecution. In 1981, however, the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees declared that all Salvadorans who had left their country 
since the beginning of 1980 should be considered bona fide refugees, on the grounds that 
the Salvadorans fled from the consequences of political events in which they did not 
necessarily play an active role, and that they and their families are likely to suffer if 
returned to El Salvador. l07 Similarly, Haitians and Kampucheans are often categorized as 
"economic" refugees while people fleeing similar circumstances in Vietnam, Poland, the 
Soviet Union, or other communist regimes are considered "political refugees."IOH The 
United States is by no means the only country to take its foreign policy interests into 
consideration when formulating immigration policy .109 However, such examples illustrate 
that the definition is not the problem. Rather, domestic implementation allows States to 
unilaterally manipulate the definition to suit their perceived national and foreign policy 
interests. Given this form of implementation, one could surmise that the same fate would 
befall an expanded definition of refugee. 
It would be naive, and perhaps even foolish, to think that a country implementing its 
own laws in its domestic setting will not take its own national and foreign policy interests 
into consideration at least to some degree. This is especially true when considering 
sensitive decisions such as a grant of asylum, which foreign nations may perceive as an 
\03 Plender, supra note 10, at 47 n.7. 
\04 Id. at 47. The United States incorporated the definition of refugee from the 1967 Protocol 
into United States law through the Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 103. 
\05 See Chamberlain, supra note 10, at 103. 
106 See supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
\07 WORLD REFUGEE SURVEY, supra note I, at 43-44. The Canadian government has adopted a 
policy with regard to Salvadoran refugees which is very similar to that of the UNHCR. As a result, an 
"underground railroad" has developed to transport Salvadorans threatened with deportation by the 
United States to Canada. See, Bierman, Salvador Immigrants Fleeing to Canada, Boston Globe, March 
12,1985, at II, cols. 2-6. This illustrates another problem with the domestic implementation of the 
1951 Convention: the burden will fall disproportionately on those countries which adopt broader 
definitions. 
10" Chamberlain, supra note 10, at 103-04. It is perhaps significant that prior to the enactment of 
the Refugee Act of 1980, which incorporated into United States law the definition of refugee 
contained in the 1951 Convention and Protocol, the definition of refugee in United States law 
applied only to persons who came from Communist-dominated and Middle-Eastern countries. See, 
LeMaster and Zall, Compassion Fatigue: The Expansion of Refugee Admi.Hions to the United States, 6 B.C. 
INT'L & COMPo L. REV. 447, 456 (1983). 
\09 Id. at 104. 
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unfriendly action. Therefore, a long-term approach to the problem of ensuring consis-
tent and impartial application of the existing definition of refugee should involve en-
forcement or decision-making by a regional or international organization. Only in this 
way can the effect of the national and foreign policy interests of both the host country and 
the homeland of the refugee be lessened. 
V. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS 
A. UNHCR Supervisory Powers 
One method of ensuring consistent application of the standards for admission of 
refugees is for the UNHCR to exercise its right under the 1951 Convention to receive 
information from the parties to the Convention with regard to their implementation of 
the Convention. It could then utilize this information in conjunction with its power to 
supervise the Convention. 
Article 35(2) of the 1951 Convention and article 11(2) of the 1967 Protocol state that 
the contracting States must provide the UNHCR with any information or statistical data 
requested "concerning: (a) the condition of refugees, (b) the implementation of this 
Convention, and (c) laws regulations and decrees which are, or may hereafter be, in force 
relating to refugees." The UNHCR is entitled to this information in order that it may 
"make reports to the competent organs of the United Nations." 
It is unclear for what purpose other organs of the United Nations would utilize such 
information. Nevertheless, the creation of specific, rigorous reporting requirements by 
the UNHCR pursuant to articles 35(2) and 11(2), along with the subsequent dissemination 
of these reports to the members of the General Assembly might encourage fair, consis-
tent, and impartial actions under the Convention by having the actual extent of each 
State's implementation of the Convention and their actions under the Convention pub-
licized. This approach is not without precedent. The International Labor Organization 
has utilized similar procedures with some success. 110 It is also similar to the publicity 
method used by Amnesty International to pressure governments into respecting the 
human rights of their citizens. 
Paragraph 8(a) of Chapter 11 of the Statute of the UNHCR charges the High 
Commissioner with, inter alia, "[p]romoting the conclusion and ratification of interna-
tional conventions for the protection of refugees, supervising their application, and propos-
ing amendments thereto ... " (emphasis added). 111 While not specifically charging the 
High Commissioner with the supervision of the 1951 Convention, article 35( 1) of the 
Convention expressly states that contracting States shall "undertake to cooperate with the 
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner, or any other agency of the United 
Nations which may succeed it, in the exercise of its functions, and [they] shall in particular 
facilitate its duty of supervising the application of the provisions of this Convention." For 
those states party to the Protocol only, the same language is contained in article II(l) of the 
1967 Protocol. 
110 See generally, F. KIRGIS, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN THEIR LEGAL SETTINGS 443-61 
(1977) for a discussion of how the publication of information concerning a State's actions under a 
treaty can create a "mobilization of shame" sufficient to change the actions of a State. 
111 See Article 1 of the Statute of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees, adopted 14 December 1950, G.A. Res. 428, 5 U.N. GAOR, Supp. 20, at 46, U.N. Doc. 
A/1775 (1950). 
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These provisions read together indicate that the parties to the 1951 Convention and 
1967 Protocol have agreed to grant some type of supervisory status to the UNHCR. No 
specific provisions of either the 1951 Convention, the 1967 Protocol or the High Commis-
sioner's Statute, however, elaborate on this function or provide the Office of the High 
Commissioner with any specific enforcement or supervisory powers. Hence, its effective-
ness as an enforcement mechanism remains unclear. 
B. Individual Right to Petition 
At the Consultation on European Refugees, held in Geneva in 1976, it was suggested 
that a European Refugee Commission be created to hear appeals by individuals against 
negative eligibility decisions in the participating countries.!!2 It was felt that such an 
approach would help move toward a more uniform interpretation and application of the 
1951 Convention and other relevant instruments. 
An important issue this proposal raises by implication is the creation of an individual 
right to petition. Under customary international law, individuals do not have standing to 
bring suit in a court of international law or any other court established by international 
convention (unless, of course, the convention specifically grants that right).!!3 Unlike 
other human rights conventions, the 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol do not create a 
right of petition for individuals. Therefore, the only parties with standing to bring suit are 
the refugee's country of origin, or the country in which the refugee is attempting to 
obtain asylum. When an individual has been denied asylum by a receiving State, it is hard 
to conceive under what circumstances the latter would be motivated to enforce the 
Convention's provisions. Similarly, because a refugee is by definition without the protec-
tion of his or her country of origin, the former is in a very questionable position to press 
for enforcement of the Convention on behalf of its national. The only party in whose 
direct interest it would be to actually enforce the terms of the Convention is the individual 
refugee or other concerned individuals or groups.!14 
The individual's right to petition is not unknown in international law. In the area of 
human rights it is emerging with increasing frequency. On a regional level, the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms provides 
that any person, nongovernmental organization, or group of individuals claiming to be 
the victim of a violation by a party of the rights set forth in the Convention may petition 
the European Commission on Human RightsY5 In addition, the Convention established 
112 A. GRAHL-MADSEN, TERRITORIAL ASYLUM 100 (l980). 
113 2 H. LAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW 489-93 (E. Lauterpacht ed. 1975). 
114 See generally, Sinha, An Anthropocentric View of Asylum in International Law, 10 COL. J. TRANS-
NAT'L L. 78, 101-02 (1971): 
How is [the refugee's) protection under the Convention to be enforced for his benefit? 
In the international legal system he suffers from disabilities and needs the state to 
espouse his claim against the offending state. He obviously cannot rely in this matter 
upon the diplomatic protection of the state from whose government he is fleeing. The 
state of refuge might give him its diplomatic protection against other states, but he still 
has no means of enforcing his rights against the state of refuge .... In any event, the 
espousal of his claim is not a matter of right: rather, it is a matter of the state's will. 
It should be pointed out that many countries, including the United States, allow refugees petitioning 
for asylum to appeal decisions through the domestic judicial system. This right is also assured by art. 
16 of the 1951 Convention. See supra note 46. For an argument that recent proposals to reform 
United States immigration law threaten this right, see Note, U.S. Immigration and Refugee Reform: A 
Critical Evaluation, 22 VA. J. INT'L L. 805, 830-32 (l982). 
115 See Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 213 
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the European Court of Human Rights in order to ensure the enforcement of the 
Convention's provisions. 116 
Construction of such a system to supplement and enforce the 1951 Convention is 
probably not very likely to occur in the near future, especially given the apparent lack of 
international consensus on the entire subject of the status of refugees in international law. 
The safeguards afforded by this type of system, however, would go far to ensure the 
consistent application of existing norms. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Despite arguments by many writers to expand the definition of refugee contained in 
the 1951 Convention to include victims of economic unrest or natural disasters, 117 and a 
movement toward expanding the definition on a regional level,1I8 the international 
consensus, based upon the deliberations on the Draft Convention on Territorial Asylum, 
appears to be against such a change. 1I9 Even if such a change was achieved, it is unlikely 
that much would be accomplished by it. This is because the 1951 Convention is im-
plemented solely through the domestic laws of each of its contracting States and hence the 
interpretation and application of its provisions are subject to each State's sense of national 
interest. 12o A better course of action would be to attempt to ensure the consistent applica-
tion of existing norms. This could be attempted by the UNHCR through its power under 
the 1951 Convention to receive information from States with regard to their implementa-
tion of the Convention. 121 Publication of such reports have, in the past, achieved some 
success in motivating States to alter their behavior. 122 Another method would be to create 
an individual right to petition under the Convention. 123 Though many States, including 
the United States, do allow aliens to appeal asylum decisions through the domestic judicial 
system, an international or regional tribunal would be necessary to ensure that humanita-
rian, rather than political, concerns predominate. 
Elizabeth J. Lentini 
U.N.T.S. 222 (effective September 3, 1953) art. 25(1); The Protocol to the Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 213 U.N.T.S. 262 (effective May 18, 
1954). 
116 Id. at Section IV. The right to petition, however, is predicated on the requirement that the 
party against whom the complaint is made has formally recognized the competence of the Commis-
sion to receive such petitions (art. 25) and only after all domestic remedies have been exhausted (art. 
26). 
117 See supra notes 9-15 & 40-60 and accompanying text. 
118 See supra notes 70-95 and accompanying text. 
1\9 See supra notes 102-09 and accompanying text. 
\20 See supra notes 110-11 and accompanying text. 
\2\ Id. 
\22 See supra notes 112-16 and accompanying text. 
\23 See supra notes 102-09 and accompanying text. 
